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TINKER TAKES THE FIELD: DO STUDENT
ATHLETES SHED THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AT THE LOCKER ROOM GATE?
NOEL JOHNSON*
Execution of the coach's will is paramount.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A successful team is often directed by the single, authoritarian voice of its
coach. The imposition of the coach's will ensures the team takes the field
united around a single goal, competing as a cohesive unit. However, a coach
must maintain order and discipline in a way that does not cause resentment
among his players. How a coach is received by his players often has a direct
effect on a team. Teams that do not trust or follow their coaches' orders often
do not win as much as those teams without such troubles. Consequently, a
coach's successful ability to maintain order and discipline necessarily lays the
groundwork for a team's chemistry and potentially for its success on the field.
But, at what cost should we uphold a coach's need to run his team as he sees
fit? We are more likely to tolerate abusive and demeaning coaching methods
where professional athletes are involved, but such tactics are often used at the
high school level to maintain order and push athletes to win. However, there
is a point where even students who are winning will rebel against a coach who
pushes them too hard. When a high school athlete or an entire team speaks out
against a coach, the United States Constitution may potentially be invoked.
In the public high school setting, a coach's ability to maintain order in
response to a mutiny cannot infringe on a student athlete's constitutional right
to freely express himself, but where to draw the line on limiting speech is a
difficult question when sports are concerned. Restrictions on speech are
difficult to justify when the goal of the restriction is to promote team
chemistry and to ultimately win. When the justification is phrased as
protecting against the substantial disruption of a school activity, the limitation
seems more reasonable.
* Noel Johnson graduated cum laude from Marquette University Law School and earned the
Sports Law Certificate from the National Sports Law Institute in 2010. He is an associate with Bopp,
Coleson & Bostrom in Terre Haute, Indiana and specializes in First Amendment law.
1. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190 (6th Cir. 1995).
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Schools offer team sports for a variety of compelling reasons-to teach
leadership, sportsmanship, humility, respect, and teamwork. It is the goal of
the coach to see that these values are instilled in the athletes and avoid
disruption that may otherwise inhibit this goal. However, dissention among a
team can also affect team chemistry, an ingredient that is often essential to the
goal of winning, which is equally the job of the coach. It is with these two
goals in mind that a coach is entrusted as the sole leader of a team. However,
coaches often resort to abusive and degrading methods to achieve these goals,
causing players to speak out.
Faced with the issue of whether a school may constitutionally discipline
student athletes for petitioning for their coach's resignation, two federal circuit
courts have reached opposing conclusions. Consequently, the proper free
speech protection for student athletes remains undecided. This paper will
discuss the following: (1) the history of protection of free speech in public
schools, (2) judicial application of the Constitution to student athletes, and (3)
free speech challenges brought by student athletes. This paper will conclude
by examining the proper level of constitutional protection to give to athletes
who wish to speak out against their coach.
II. THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects some of
the most basic and fundamental rights of the people.2 Perhaps more than any
of the rights listed under the First Amendment, the freedom of speech is
thought to be one of the most vital protections for its ability to limit the power
of a government that may otherwise suppress criticism or unpopular ideas. 3
Although the freedom of speech is very broad, it is not without its limitations.
Over the last century, the United States Supreme Court has upheld many
restrictions on speech 4 and afforded certain types of speech less protection.5
However, the Court has also expanded the scope of the Free Speech Clause to
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.").
3. See Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 570 (1942) (stating "[fjreedom of speech and freedom
of the press... are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties.").
4. See, e.g., Sable Comm'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988); Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973); Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
447 (1969).
5. See generally United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993) (stating that "[t]he
Constitution . . . affords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression.").
[Vol. 21:1294
TINKER TAKES THE FIELD
protect certain types of expression, recognizing "[the First Amendment's]
protection does not end at the spoken or written word." 6
Although the regulation of speech, i.e., "what is being spoken," has caused
the judiciary significant trouble on its own, the Supreme Court has also been
asked to decide questions that hinge on who is doing the speaking, e.g., public
school students.7 It was precisely this issue that was before the Court in 1969
when the free speech rights of public school students were changed forever.8
III. REGULATION OF STUDENT SPEECH
The ability of public schools to regulate student speech has been part of an
evolving body of law. In the seminal case Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,9 the Supreme Court broadly defined the free
speech rights of students and laid out the framework for determining when a
student's free speech rights have been infringed. In a way that mirrored the
evolution of the more general free speech doctrine, the Court has since
chipped away at the broad protection afforded under Tinker and, in the
process, has limited the free speech rights of students by carving out fact-
specific exceptions and forming new doctrines for types of speech that the
Court held did not fall under the reach of Tinker.10 Although Tinker's broad
shield of protection has been weathered away since 1969, it remains good and
controlling law for the majority of student speech cases.
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
The 1960s were a time of great social unrest. The country was wrought
with "political and cultural conflict, urban chaos, civil rights battles, free
speech movements on university campuses, and, perhaps most of all, the
national divide over the Vietnam War."11 It was under these conditions that
the issue of student speech rights came before the Supreme Court.
In December 1965, in an effort to publicize its objections to the Vietnam
War, a group of students and parents decided to wear black armbands during
6. Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,404 (1989).
7. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8. Id.
9. Id
10. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
11. Clay Calvert, Tinker's Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed, but Still Standing, 58 AM.
U.L. REV. 1167, 1185 (2009) (quoting Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority: Two Facets of the
Inculcation of Virtue, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 421, 421 (1995)).
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the holiday season.12 The principals of the Des Moines schools adopted a
policy that students found wearing armbands would be asked to remove
them. 13 If the student refused, he would be suspended.14 Three students wore
the black armbands to school, and in accordance with the policy, they were
sent home and suspended until they would come back without their
armbands.15 Shortly thereafter, the suspended students, through their fathers,
filed suit. 16
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court delivered an opinion that would
govern the free speech rights of students until this day.' 7 Justice Fortas began
the Court's opinion by firmly stating what would become famous words-"[i]t
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' 8
Consequently, the Court began its analysis from the standpoint that, "applied
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment," First
Amendment rights are available to students. 19 However, the Court recognized
the States' compelling interest in educating America's youth and the need "for
affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials ...
to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." 20 Applying this balance of
interests, the Court held that, under these circumstances, school officials could
not constitutionally prohibit the students' expression. 21
The Court provided a framework under which school officials may restrict
student speech in accordance with the Constitution. The Court forbade mere
viewpoint discrimination, which it described as placing a restriction on student
speech merely to "avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 22 Rather, in order to restrict speech, a
school must be able to demonstrate facts that might reasonably lead "school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities." 23  However, "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
12. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
13. Id.
14. Id
15. Id
16. Id.
17. See generally id.
18. Id. at 506.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 507 (citation omitted).
21. Id at 508, 514.
22. Id. at 509.
23. Id. at 514. The Tinker framework is often referred to as the "material disruption test."
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TINKER TAKES THE FIELD
disturbance" is not enough to meet this burden. 24 Applying these principles to
the suspended Des Moines students, the Court found their expression was
nothing more than a "silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by
any disorder" 25 and that the record was void of any evidence that would have
led school officials to anticipate a material disruption. 26
Tinker left students with seemingly broad protection; however, it did not
provide school officials with complete guidance on how certain they must be
that a disruption will occur before they may permissibly restrict a student's
speech. Nevertheless, federal courts have interpreted Tinker to require
"specificity and concreteness" or a "well-founded expectation of disruption,"
perhaps "based on past incidents arising out of similar speech." 27
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have both limited Tinker's reach and
further developed the scope of a student's free speech rights.28 Although there
may be some lingering confusion as how to deal with new student free speech
cases, most courts can agree on two guiding principles: (1) students' free
speech rights are not the same as those held by adults in other contexts and (2)
students' rights must be shaped with the special circumstances of schools in
mind. 29
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF STUDENT ATHLETES
When student athletes are suspended, regulated, or restricted in some
manner, they often bring constitutional challenges. In deciding these cases,
courts have sometimes gone deeper than the "special circumstances" of the
school environment implicated in free speech cases. Often, the nature of the
school activity in question, namely sports, plays a role in a court's application
of constitutional protection.
24. Id. at 508.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 509.
27. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Chandler v.
McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that wearing of "Scabs" buttons
to protest replacement teachers during a strike was not inherently disruptive); but see West v. Derby
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1365 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (holding that
drawing a Confederate flag on a chalk board was substantially disruptive based on past racial
tension).
28. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988) (school-sponsored speech); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986) (vulgar/offensive speech).
29. Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech after Morse v. Frederick, 17 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 657, 667 (2009).
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A. Non-Free Speech Challenges Brought by Student Athletes
Courts have uniformly denied challenges brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 holding that there is no constitutional right to participate in
athletics. 3' "The [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment
extends constitutional protection to . . . fundamental aspects of life, liberty,
and property that rise to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement."' 32
However, courts hold that participation in sports falls outside the scope of due
process because it "amounts to a mere expectation rather than a
constitutionally protected claim of entitlement." 33
The religious beliefs or practices of student-athletes and the policies and
rules of schools or athletic associations also often conflict. 34 Challenges to
these rules are usually brought under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. 35 Upholding concerns for player safety as a compelling interest,
courts have held that schools do not violate a student athlete's constitutional
rights by restricting the wearing of religious headwear or jewelry. 36 Also
citing player safety, a court has refused to find a constitutional violation where
a school mandated immunization as a condition for eligibility. 37
The nature of sports has helped uphold other restrictions as well, including
a football team's no-facial-hair-grooming policy 38 and a transfer rule. 39
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
31. See Angstadt v. Midd-West Sch. Dist., 377 F.3d 338, 345 (3d Cir. 2004); Brentwood Acad. v.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 180 F.3d 758, 763 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 531
U.S. 288 (2001); Alerding v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 779 F.2d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1985); Niles
v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 715 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1983).
32. In re United States ex rel. Mo.State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 682 F.2d 147, 153 n.8 (8th
Cir. 1982).
33. See e.g., id.
34. See Scott C. Idleman, Religious Freedom and the Interscholastic Athlete, 12 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REv. 295, 329-39 (2001).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion... .").
36. Idleman, supra note 34, at 334-36 (citing Menora v. Ill. High Sch Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030,
1032-33 (7th Cir. 1982); Harris v. N.Y. State Athletic Comm'n, 392 N.Y.S.2d 70, 71 (N.Y. App. Div.
1977)).
37. Idelman, supra note 34, at 336-39.
38. Humphries v. Lincoln Parish Sch. Bd., 467 So. 2d 870, 872 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
improving academic and athletic performance by football teams members were constitutionally
permissive objectives of the grooming policy).
39. In re United States ex rel. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n., 682 F.2d 147, 152 (8th Cir.
1982) (equal protection challenge); see also Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d
222, 243 (Ind. 1998) (holding that "prevent[ing] the evils associated with recruiting of high school
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TINKER TAKES THE FIELD
Perhaps most important to the free speech analysis of this paper is the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Vernonia School District v. Acton,
where the Court was asked to determine whether a school district's
suspicionless drug-testing policy for student athletes violated the Fourth
Amendment. 40 In finding the policy constitutional, the Court stated that
student athletes voluntarily subject themselves to a greater degree of
regulation than the normal student body by voluntarily choosing to go out for
the team: "[S]tudents who voluntarily participate in school athletics have
reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including
privacy."41
As the above cases illustrate, courts have continuously considered the
special characteristics of sports and the school's need to administer those
sports in a safe and uniform way in ruling on constitutional challenges brought
by student athletes. The reasoning of these cases can and has been applied to
free speech cases.
B. Free Speech Challenges Brought by Student Athletes
The case law on free speech violations relating to team sports has been
limited.42 However, two recent cases involving coaches who conditioned
continued athletic participation upon a player apologizing to teammates are
particularly relevant to the question of how a coach may respond when his
team petitions against him.
1. Seamons v. Snow43
In the fall of 1993, Brian Seamons was assaulted in the locker room by a
group of his teammates. 44 Seamons reported the incident to his football coach
athletes and transfers motivated by athletics" is a constitutionally permissible objective of a transfer
rule).
40. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47Jv. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).
41. Id. at 657 (citation omitted).
42. See generally Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 946 (D. Kan. 1987)
(denying summary judgment to coach who required black football players who had boycotted practice
to protest discrimination to apologize in order to remain on the football team); Boyd v. Bd. of Dir. of
McGee Sch. Dist. No. 17, 612 F. Supp. 86, 94 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (holding coach liable for suspending
black players who peacefully protested and boycotted a pep rally and game); Williams v. Eaton, 443
F.2d 422, 434 (10th Cir. 1971) (denying summary judgment to coach who suspended black players
who wore protest armbands during game).
43. Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2000).
44. Id. at 1023. Seamons was "bound ... to a towel rack with highly adhesive athletic tape.
Another teammate brought a girl Seamons had dated into the locker room so that she could see what
had been done to him." Id.
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and school principal, who investigated the matter. 45 Surprisingly, Seamons'
coach conditioned his rejoining the team on apologizing to his teammates for
reporting the incident. 46 Seamons refused to apologize and was told that he
was off of the team. 47 Seamons filed suit, alleging his free speech rights had
been violated. 48  In reversing the district court, the Tenth Circuit held
Seamons had alleged sufficient facts on his First Amendment claim to survive
the summary judgment stage. 49
Several things from the Tenth Circuit's opinion are relevant. First, the
court did not expressly apply Tinker or any other test to Seamons' actions but
held that Seamons' case was factually similar to other cases where summary
judgment was denied to schools that suspended athletes for exercising their
First Amendment rights.50 The Tenth Circuit viewed those cases as standing
for the proposition that "coaches may not penalize players for engaging in
peaceful speech activit[ies], which [do] not create substantial disorder,
materially disrupt class work, or invade the rights of others." 51 Second, the
court impliedly rejected the district court's analogy to First Amendment issues
in the public sector 52 and the emphasis placed on "harmony," "team unity,"
and the close working relationships that are necessary for both the proper
functioning of a team and safety of the players. 53 In rejecting the reasoning
from Connick v. Meyers, the court made no mention of the content of
Seamons' speech-i.e., whether a court should consider the value of a
student's speech as part of its First Amendment analysis. 54 Taking these two
factors together, the court implied that Seamons' actions could not be
punished under Tinker because merely disrupting the unity of a high school
athletic team is not enough to overcome Tinker's material disruption
45. Id
46. Id at 1024.
47. Id.
48. Id
49. Id at 1028.
50. Id at 1030. See generally Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Sup. 940 (D. Kan.
1987) (denying summary judgment to coach who required black football players who had boycotted
practice to protect discrimination to apologize in order to remain on the football team).
51. Seamons, 206 F.3d at 1030.
52. The district court analogized high school teammates to the assistant district attorneys in
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983), "where the Supreme Court held that a district attorney
did not violate the First Amendment when he fired an employee for disrupting morale and harmony
within the district attorney's office." Seamons v. Snow, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1158 (D. Utah 1998).
53. See Seamons, 206 F.3d at 1030 n.4 (stating that the defendant wisely did not appeal the
district court's reasoning in applying Connick); Seamons, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
54. See Seamons, 206 F.3d at 1027.
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requirement.55
2. Wildman v. Marshalltown School District56
Shortly after Seamons, the Eighth Circuit was called upon to decide a
similar issue.57 Upset that she was not promoted to play on the varsity
basketball team, sophomore Rebecca Wildman distributed a letter to her
teammates expressing her displeasure with the varsity coach.58 The letter was
brought to the attention of several coaches and Wildman was given an
ultimatum-apologize for the "disrespectful letter" or she would not be
allowed back on the team. 59 Wildman refused and was not allowed to finish
the season. 60 Wildman brought suit against her former coach and school,
alleging that her removal from the basketball team for failing to apologize
violated her rights under the First Amendment. 61 The district court granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 62 Wildman appealed, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. 63
Like the Tenth Circuit's decision in Seamons, several factors are notable
from the Eighth Circuit's opinion. First, the court found that Wildman's letter
was sufficiently disruptive under Tinker; however, it did not expressly indicate
what it determined was disrupted. 64  Second, the court cites to, without
necessarily endorsing, the school's athletic handbook, which indicates that
"disrespect and insubordination will result in disciplinary action." 65 Third,
regardless of which specific standard the court applied, it essentially engaged
in a balancing of interests. 66 The court first noted the school's alleged
interest-"affording Wildman's teammates an educational environment
conducive to learning team unity and sportsmanship and free from disruptions
and distractions that could hurt or stray the cohesiveness of the team." 67
Without expressly stating that Wildman's letter substantially disrupted this
55. See id. at 1030.
56. Wildman v. Marshalltown Bd. of Educ., 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001).
57. Id. at 769.
58. Id. at 769-70.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 769.
62. Id. at 770-71.
63. Id.
64. Id at 771-72.
65. Id. at 771.
66. Id at 771-72.
67. Id at 771.
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interest, the court noted that "coaches deserve a modicum of respect from
athletes, particularly in an academic setting" and agreed with the district
court's conclusion that Wildman's letter suggested that the team unite in
defiance of the coach.68
The court also discussed Wildman's interest, holding that there exists a
difference between being in the classroom and playing on an athletic team. 69
The difference is that students have a greater interest in attending school to
learn than they do in participating in sports. 70 In addition, Wildman was only
required to apologize to her team and coach to regain her spot on the team,
something the court found to be reasonable, apparently in light of the low
interest students hold in playing school sports.71 Consequently, the Eighth
Circuit found the school's interest outweighed Wildman's interest. 72
Finally, in distinguishing Wildman's situation from the student's situation
in Seamons, the court weighed the importance of Wildman's speech. 73 The
discussion is brief, but the Eighth Circuit implied Wildman's letter, motivated
solely by her disappointment in not playing varsity basketball, did not
compare to Seamons, who blew the whistle on an egregious hazing incident.74
As the above two cases show, courts have used differing analyses and
come to different conclusions on when a coach may constitutionally restrict a
student athlete's speech. The Eighth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit both
applied Tinker's principles; however, the courts differed on their choice to
balance interests, to place emphasis on the importance of sports, and to weigh
the importance of a student's speech. In the next decade, two more cases
would be added to the mix, further complicating the appropriate level of free
speech protection for student athletes.
V. FREE SPEECH AND PETITIONING AGAINST THE COACH
In Wildman, the court was asked whether to protect or restrict the speech
of a lone, disgruntled team member who expressed displeasure with her
coach.71 However, two cases have arisen since then that have required the
court to deal with the speech of many team members who have unified their
voice in the form of a petition, aimed at removing a coach they felt had
68. Id. at 772.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 770.
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become abusive. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits were not able to easily define
the scope of protection for student athletes, reaching opposing conclusions
when dealing with factually similar situations. However, although their
conclusions may differ, their analyses provide important insight.
A. Pinard v. Clatskanie School District 6J76
In 2001, members of the Clatskanie varsity boys' basketball team called a
team meeting to discuss their coach, Jeff Baughman. 77 The team had become
upset with Baughman-many characterizing his coaching methods as abusive,
humiliating, and physically intimidating.78 Following a game earlier in the
season, Baughman sat the team down and allegedly placed his fate in his
players' hands, stating, "[I]f they don't want me to be their coach say the word
and I'll go." 79 Following the team meeting, the team members typed up a
petition that expressed their displeasure with Baughman's coaching methods
and asked that he be replaced as coach.80 The petition was delivered to
Baughman the next day. 8' Upset by the petition, Baughman informed the
school that he would not be coaching in that night's game. 82 The school's
principal gave the team a choice-either participate in a mediation process to
resolve the dispute or stand by the assertions made in their petition, refuse to
board the bus for that night's game, and forfeit their privilege to play in the
game. 83 The players chose not to board the bus. 84 Ultimately, those players
who signed the petition and chose not to board the bus were dismissed from
the team.85
The players filed suit, alleging that the school punished them for
complaining about their coach in violation of their free speech rights. 86 The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the
First Amendment was inapplicable because the "speech was not a matter of
76. Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006); Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch.
Dist. 6J, 319 F.Supp.2d 1214 (D. Or. 2004); Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 2008 WL 410097 (D.
Or. 2008).
77. Pinard, 467 F.3d at 760.
78. Id. at 760 n.4-5.
79. Id. at 760 n.6.
80. Id. at 760-61.
81. Id. at 761.
82. Id at 761-62.
83. Id. at 761.
84. Id at 762.
85. Id One player signed the petition but boarded the bus for the game. He was not dismissed.
Id.
86. Id at 763.
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public concern nor political in nature" or, in the alternative, that the speech
could be permissibly regulated under Tinker's material disruption test.87 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed, and reversed and remanded the case.88
The Ninth Circuit ultimately held: (1) Tinker's test examines only effect,
i.e., the disruptive nature of the speech, and such speech is not subject to any
value judgment or any "public concern" requirement;89 (2) schools do not
need to wait until disruption occurs before suppressing speech; 90 (3) the
team's petition was protected speech, subject to Tinker's material disruption
test;91 and (4) the school could not constitutionally punish the team for the
petition under Tinker because the grievances were aired privately, and the
school had no reason to anticipate disruption. 92 The court reasoned that had
the players known of Baughman's decision not to coach that night, they would
have chosen to board the bus and no disruption would have occurred. 93
Additionally, it was school officials who gave the students the option of not
boarding the bus; hence, the school had no reason to think that the petition
alone would cause any material disruption. 94 Finally, (5) the school could
constitutionally punish the team for its boycott because, assuming it was
protected speech, the boycott sufficiently and materially disrupted the
basketball team's operations, which the court viewed as part of the school's
educational program. 95 On remand, the district court held that the students
had sufficiently made out a case for retaliation due to the petition to survive
summary judgment. 96
Similar to the court in Wildman, the Ninth Circuit applied Tinker. The
court declined to apply any government employment context precedent,
instead stressing that Tinker does not limit a student's rights to the exercise of
87. Id.
88. Id. at 771-72.
89. Id. at 766-67 (citation omitted). The court reiterated that Tinker's material disruption test
extends to a student's personal views and opinions. Id. at 766.
90. Id. at 767 n. 17 (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 765.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 768-69.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 769.
96. Pinard v. Clatskanie, 2008 WL 410097, *6 (D. Or. 2008). In ruling in the student's favor, the
court determined (1) there was evidence school officials opposed the petition because it led them to
give the students a choice to not participate in the next game and (2) the school's assertion that it
suspended the students only for the boycott appeared pretextual considering evidence that school
officials both proposed the boycott and withheld information from the students that may have averted
the boycott. Id. at *4.
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political speech or matters of public concern. 97 Therefore, so long as speech
is not governed by Fraser, Hazelwood, or Morse, any speech is protected if it
does not cause disruption.98 However, as the court notes, if Tinker included a
public concern requirement, the petition would qualify99 because it concerned
"the school's performance of its duties to supervise its teachers . . . and [to]
provide a safe and appropriate learning environment for its students."o10 Also,
the court viewed Tinker as requiring a factual inquiry into "all of the
circumstances confronting the school officials;" 01 however, the court looked
at the conduct individually and distinguished between restrictions based on the
petition and restrictions based on the boycott.102 Consequently, a court may
isolate a particular event, like a petition, and subject it to Tinker's test.
The court recognized the school's interest in a basketball team and placed
emphasis on the school's investment of time and money in running a sports
program rather than the intangible benefits derived from playing team
sports.103 Because of this investment, the team could not disrupt basketball
operations and be protected by the Constitution.104 The court made no
mention of a coach's need to regulate the conduct of his team or the need for
team unity.10
Finally, the court did not attach a public concern requirement, but it did
hint at the importance of protecting the type of speech at issue as part of its
First Amendment retaliation analysis. 106 The court stated that allowing the
school to punish its athletes for their petition "would lead ordinary student
athletes in the plaintiffs' position to refrain from complaining about an abusive
coach in order to remain on the team."1 07
Pinard is an example of a mechanical and straight-forward application of
Tinker. However, the court declined to discuss a seemingly important aspect
of sports-the need for the coach to maintain order and discipline. The link to
97. Pinard, 467 F.3d at 766 (citation omitted).
98. Id at 767; see generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. V.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
99. Id. at 767 n.18.
100. Id (citing Brewster v. Bd. of Educ., 149 F.3d 971, 978 (9th Cir. 1998)).
101. Id at 768 (quoting LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 1998)).
102. Id at 768-69.
103. Id at 769.
104. Id at 769-70.
105. Id at 767-68.
106. Id at 772. Although the court refused to apply public employment context doctrines to
Tinker, the court did apply the framework for First Amendment retaliation that arose from the public
employee context. Id. at 770 n.20.
107. Id. at 771.
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disruption may not be as direct as a boycott, but stripping the coach's ability to
coach his players as he sees necessary may likewise cause substantial
interference with the operations of a team. Soon after Pinard, the Sixth
Circuit would get the chance to place value on the coach's authority.
B. Lowery v. Euverard108
During the 2005 season, many Jefferson County High School football
players became dissatisfied with their coach's methods.109 According to team
members, Coach Marty Euverard "struck a player [on his] helmet, threw
away ... recruiting letters, humiliated and degraded [them], and required ...
year-round conditioning . .. in violation of the rules.""l0 Several members of
the team typed up a petition that stated: "'I hate Coach Euvard [sic] and I don't
want to play for him."'lli In all, eighteen players signed the petition.112
After learning of the petition, the coaches questioned all members of the team
individually." 3 Three members of the team refused to be questioned and
were told to "pick up their things and leave."1 4 On the way out, one player
addressed the team: "'I know how much you hate him, and you guys need to
leave with us right now."'l15 Ultimately, "players who signed the petition but
apologized to [Coach] Euverard were allowed to remain on the team."1l6
Those who refused to apologize were dismissed from the team.117 Several
months later, the dismissed players filed suit, alleging their First Amendment
rights were violated. "18
The Sixth Circuit framed the issue much differently than other circuits
before it, asking "what is the proper balance between a student athlete's First
Amendment rights and a coach's need to maintain order and discipline?""19
As such, the court's opinion is extraordinarily sports-centric. The analysis can
be summarized as follows: Tinker governs the speech;120 however, the speech
108. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007).
109. Id. at 585.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citation omitted).
112. Id at 585-86.
113. Id at 586.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citation omitted).
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id at 586-87.
119. Id at 586.
120. Id. at 587-88.
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must be viewed in the context of a high school sports football program where
the following things are relevant-(a) students have no constitutional right to
participate in extracurricular activities; 121 (b) "student athletes are subject to
more restrictions than the student body at large[;]"l 22 and (c) although an
athletic team may provide other benefits to players, its main purpose is to win,
"and the coach [necessarily] determines how best to obtain that goal."l 23 The
court considered the coach's methods irrelevant to its inquiry and viewed the
issue as not simply about viewpoint discrimination but rather the players'
"alleged right to belong to the . . . team on their own terms."124
Viewed through this lens, the court held that the school's actions were
constitutional under Tinker.125 Consequently, unlike the court in Pinard, the
Sixth Circuit held that a petition alone can cause the requisite disruption under
Tinker.126 The court placed enormous emphasis on a coach's authority,
holding that "it was reasonable for Defendants to believe that the petition
would disrupt the team, by eroding Euverard's authority and dividing players
into opposing camps."1 27 Authority, the court reasoned, is essential for a
coach to lead and to accomplish the goals of an athletic team; a team cannot
function properly if the will of the coach is up for debate among the
players.128 Additionally, the court viewed unity and team chemistry as
immeasurable and essential ingredients to winning and reasoned that a petition
aimed at firing a coach will significantly disrupt unity and team chemistry by
causing players to choose between supporting their coach and supporting their
teammates. 129 Borrowing from Wildman, the court found that such disruption
would ultimately inhibit the school from carrying out its duty to provide
educational, athletic opportunities free from distractions.130
The court distinguished Pinard on the ground that Coach Baughman
placed his authority in question by saying he would resign if his players did
not want him as coach. 131 This, the court reasoned, was "consistent with the
121. Id (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 180 F.3d 758, 763 (6th
Cir. 1999)).
122. Id at 589 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 600-01.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 596.
128. Id. at 591.
129. Id at 595.
130. Id at 596.
131. Id at 591.
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top-down authority structure" of schools and sports teams. 132 A coach may
put his authority in question on his own, "but this does not mean [that] the
players have a . .. right to unilaterally" question that authority.133 The court
distinguished Seamons on the ground that the speech in question involved
blowing the whistle on improprieties and the plaintiff did not attempt to have
his coach fired.134 However, the court found the situation most analogous to
Wildman because both letters suggested that the team unite in defiance of its
coach, which is clearly disruptive in the court's opinion.135
Most interestingly, the court made analogies to the public employment
sector discussed in Connick, holding that, much like government employers do
not need to tolerate private grievances that undermine authority and working
relationships in the office, coaches need not tolerate the same on an athletic
team. 136 However, the court asserted that it did not graft a public-concern
requirement onto the Tinker analysis 37 but rather simply stated that one may
not participate in a voluntary program on one's own terms.138 The court also
agreed with Wildman that the school did not interfere with the plaintiffs'
regular education when it suspended them.139 Moreover, the students were
"free to continue their campaign to have [Coach] Euverard fired," but they
simply could not do so as part of the team. 140
VI. THE PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR STUDENT ATHLETE SPEECH
As the above cases illustrate, Tinker's "material disruption test" continues
to govern student athlete free speech cases. The above cases also illustrate
how applying Tinker to sports-specific situations can be difficult. This
difficulty is understandable; however, if and until the Supreme Court chooses
to carve out another exception for these types of cases, the proper way to apply
free speech and constitutional precedent to these situations will remain largely
undecided.
Below is an attempt to synthesize and weigh the factors of all the
decisions discussed above by creating a reasonable approach to balance a
student's free speech rights with the coach's ability to maintain order and
132. Id.
133. Id
134. Id at 591, 600.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 599.
137. Id. at 598 n.5.
138. Id. at 600.
139. Id (quoting Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2001)).
140. Id
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discipline and a school's interest in offering sports.
A. The School's Interest In Avoiding Disruption
Providing sports opportunities to students is an important educational
objective. Naturally, the goal of a team is to win, but sports provide students
with many more benefits than simply the thrill of victory. Apart from judicial
endorsement of these benefits in Wildman and Lowery, Congress has
recognized the importance of sports: "Participation in sports teaches youth
critical life skills and has a significant positive impact on all areas of their
lives." 41 Therefore, the school's interest described in Tinker applies with
enough force on the playing field to justify restrictions on a student athlete's
speech if it causes substantial disruption.
Disruption of a team can mean more than one thing. Lowery went beyond
protecting the educational objectives of athletics and held that a challenge to a
coach's authority and its effect on team unity are enough to justify a restriction
on a student's free speech rights. The benefits of sports can be realized
without winning, but team unity is usually desired to allow the team to win.
The need to win is something that cannot possibly trump the Bill of Rights.
However, it is on this point that the nature of athletics is important. The
Supreme Court has previously used the "special characteristics" of sports as
justifications for restrictions on constitutional rights. This does not necessarily
mean that it must make exceptions in all cases, but the precedent exists to
support limiting the constitutional rights of students who choose to play sports.
To function effectively and cohesively, the single voice of a coach must rule.
This is especially true at the high school level where the athletes are in greater
need of direction and support. The Sixth Circuit is correct that, by going out
for a team, a student implicitly agrees to accept the coach's authority.142 In
this way, student petitions are disruptive, and a coach's restriction on
insubordinate speech appears very reasonable.
The Sixth Circuit is correct on at least two more points---(1) challenging a
coach's authority and forcing a team to choose sides can have a profound
negative effect and (2) Tinker does not require a school to wait for a disruption
to occur, a school can act if facts exist that allow the school to reasonably
forecast a disruption.143 However, it does not follow that every petition
criticizing a coach will automatically create such a schism within the locker
141. High School Athletics Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 2882, 111th Cong. § 2(a)(1)
(2009).
142. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 600 (6th Cir. 2007).
143. See generally id at 584.
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room that it destroys team unity to the point of disrupting the operations of the
team. The concurring judgment in Lowery points out that the school never
claimed that the petition itself was disruptive and that the majority improperly
placed the burden on the students to prove there would not have been a
disruption. 144 The majority assumed that, because challenging a coach can
erode team chemistry, this occurred on Euverard's team. 145 By doing so, the
majority closely infringed on Tinker's admonition against restrictions on
speech based purely on "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance."1 46 The reasoning in both Pinard and Seamons is persuasive.
Where the grievance is aired privately and "responsibly tailored to the
audience .. . who need[s] to know about the incident," a school has less reason
to anticipate disruption.147  Petitions will rarely ensure disruption, and
Seamons' holding is in line with Tinker: "[C]oaches may not penalize players
for engaging in peaceful speech."l 48
Lowery correctly places value on authority and chemistry; 149 however,
Pinard may draw an easier line to forecast disruption-in the actual operations
of a team. 150 Where speech causes or is likely to cause a team to forgo actual
competition or practice, a school may restrict that speech in a similar way to
what was done in response to the players' refusal to board the bus.' 5'
Although a school need not wait until a disruption occurs, there is far less of a
risk in waiting until team chemistry breaks down causing a team to lose a
game than there is in waiting until the team refuses to play in a scheduled
game.152 Understandably, it is difficult to forecast what type of disruption
will occur, but a petition alone will not likely bring a program to a halt.153 To
decide, like the Sixth Circuit did in Lowery, that any challenge to a coach's
authority necessarily creates the requisite disruption under Tinker is
dangerous. Tinker requires facts that support a reasonable forecast of
disruption and not preconceived notions about how a team can react to inner
turmoil. 154
144. Id. at 603. (Gilman, J., concurring).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 601; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
147. Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Seamons v.
Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1237-238 (10th Cir. 1996)).
148. Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1030 (10th Cir. 2000).
149. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 595.
150. Pinard, 467 F.3d at 769.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 755.
153. See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 991 (9th Cir. 2001).
154. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
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There is also a key distinction between a coach's decision-making
authority and his authority to use any methods he sees fit to run his team. A
coach has a much lower interest in the latter, and a school cannot claim much
of an interest in protecting such authority. This distinction can help courts
distinguish between those simply complaining about playing time and those
bringing abuse to light. A court may find that a player who complains about
playing time causes disruption to decision-making authority, something a
coach necessarily must have. However, a player who challenges a coach's
abusive tactics is challenging authority that the coach should not necessarily
have, making it less reasonable to forecast disruption to a coach's regular
ability to lead his team.
There is no easy line to draw between a tough coach and an abusive coach.
However, a team is usually clear about the purpose of its speech. The Lowery
court agreed that Seamons' speech, the purpose of which was "reporting
improprieties," 5 5 was worthy of protection. Were the Jefferson football
players not blowing the whistle on their coach's improprieties? Did they
simply need to be clearer about their intentions? Interestingly, the lawyer who
represented the athletes in Pinard took the case as part of his "rebellion against
destructive coaching."1 56 Despite this, neither court considered the coach's
methods as part of the disruption analysis.157
B. The Content ofAthlete Speech
The content of the athlete's speech can be a factor in the material
disruption test. The subject matter of speech has not been immune to a value
test, and despite no precedent to expressly attach any public concern
requirement, Connick need not be the standard. The Supreme Court
recognized that core political speech strikes closer to the heart of the First
Amendment than does vulgar speech or speech that promotes illegal drug
use. 158 Likewise, both the Wildman and Lowery courts recognized that
complaining about playing time and challenging a coach's authority is not on
par with the speech in Tinker and Seamons.159 The difficulty lies in the fact
that Pinard reads Tinker to hold that all speech is protected and that the effect
155. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 600 (6th Cir. 2007).
156. Bruce Barcott, Count Me Out, Coach, LEGALAFFAIRS.ORG, http://www.legalaffairs.org/
printerfriendly.msp?id=466 (last visited Mar 15, 2010).
157. See generally Lowery, 497 F.3d 584; Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755 (9th
Cir. 2006).
158. See generally Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
159. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 600; Wildman v. Marshalltown, 249 F.3d 768, 772 (8th Cir. 2001).
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of the speech is all that matters. 160 However, the content of speech can be
linked to whether it causes sufficient disruption, and a court may be able to
avoid a value judgment. 161 An insubordinate letter complaining about playing
time is more easily viewed as a pure challenge to the decision-making
authority that a coach needs to have than a petition speaking out against
abusive coaching. Students must tolerate authority, but they need not tolerate
abuse. The Lowery court disregarded the purpose of the speech and in some
respects assumed that the plaintiffs were merely challenging Euverard's
authority to coach and not challenging his abusive coaching methods.162
Pinard is persuasive on this issue because it recognizes the danger in
punishing kids for speaking out against an abusive coach in that most students
will remain quiet in order to stay on the team.163 The same concern does not
exist for those kids simply complaining about playing time or not being
promoted to the varsity level.
Making a judgment on whether a petition challenges authority or abuse
would be difficult for a court to determine; however, where the purpose of
speech is blurry, Pinard shows that it is possible to isolate speech and
determine its disruptive effect independently of other speech. 164  This
distinction may ultimately be outweighed by another factor. When speech is
directed at those who seek to suppress that speech, such as coaches, a school
may have more reason to forecast disruption.165 Naturally, speech that hits
closer to home is more likely to garner attention and spur reactions, some of
which may be disruptive.
C. An Abusive Coach's Role in Causing Disruption
A school is allowed to restrict the speech of its athletes when it causes a
disruption because such a disruption inhibits an important part of the
educational mission. 166 However, what if the coach is the reason for
disruption? It seems wrong for a school to claim that it has the right to punish
those who petition against a coach because they cause a disruption when it was
the coach's actions that eroded team chemistry and necessitated the petition.
160. Pinard, 467 F.3d at 766-68 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S.
503(1969)).
161. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
162. See generally Lowery, 497 F.3d 584.
163. See Pinard, 467 F.3d at 771.
164. See id. at 769 (citation omitted).
165. See generally Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that
whether speech was directed at replacement teachers during strike could bear on disruption standard).
166. See e.g., Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2001).
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A coach's role in causing the disruption is important because it can aid a court
in drawing the line on disruption. Where a team is already in turmoil because
of an abusive coach, a court may find it unreasonable for a school to forecast a
disruption based solely on Lowery's fears about team unity and trust because
those things did not exist prior to the petition. 167 In this light, a school may
need to forecast actual disruptions of its operations, e.g., games and practices,
before dismissing students from the team.
D. The Voluntary Nature of Sports
Tinker and its progeny were clear that students do not have the same free
speech rights as adults and that their rights must be shaped within the special
characteristics of the school environment. 168 In past cases, this environment
has included the special characteristics of sports. These characteristics must
factor into a court's analysis.
Playing sports has its benefits, but participation is voluntary. At the high
school level, most, if not all, athletes know what is required of them if they
wish to belong to a team. 169 A coach must have complete authority to decide
who plays, when they play, and how they play. 170 Students must expect their
coaches to push them to win, get upset when they do not, and push them
harder the next time. This will require methods that some students may not
like. In fact, a California court recently denied an athlete's claim that her
coach inflicted emotional distress upon her, stating there is nothing wrong
with "a coach pushing an athlete to excel, and in so doing, using words that in
another context would be considered rude, demeaning and even
intimidating." 71
Further, students have no constitutional right to play sports.172 Wildman
and Lowery make clear that suspended athletes are not deprived of either their
education or their ability to speak out against the coach.1 73 They are not kept
167. See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 595.
168. Cordes, supra note 29, at 667.
169. See Lowery, 497 F.3d at 600.
170. See id. (citing Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190 (6th Cir. 1995)).
171. Calif Dad Strikes Out in Attempt to Silence Coach's Insults,
FIRSTAMENDMENTCENTER.ORG, April 3, 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?
id=16726.
172. See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 180 F.3d 758, 763 (6th
Cir. 1999), rev'don other grounds, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
173. See generally Wildman v. Marshalltown Bd. of Educ., 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2001);
Lowery, 497 F.3d 584.
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from attending class like the students in Tinker.174 They are simply kept from
criticizing their coach and playing for him at the same time. 175 Stripping the
coach of his full ability to lead and to maintain order has clear detrimental
effects on a team. If leadership and team unity are deemed unworthy
objectives, any disgruntled student may question a coach on nearly every
decision, from his starting lineup to his use of profanity, and later claim the
student's rights were violated when the student is removed from the team.
Teams cannot function under such a structure.
VII. CONCLUSION
Complaints about playing time and coaching methods are a far cry from
the bold political statement made by several students in the turbulent 1960s.
However, even in the athletic context, Tinker still governs, requiring
substantial disruption before a school may restrict the speech of athletes. In
sports, disruptions can take on a number of forms. The "special
characteristics" of athletics and coaching make it reasonable for a school to
restrict speech that challenges authority and breaks down chemistry.
However, such a broad application of disruption may silence athletes who
wish to blow the whistle on an abusive coach. Each case will rest largely on
the specific circumstances facing each school, team, and coach, but certain
guiding principles, uniquely relevant to sports, are available for courts to use.
However, unless the Supreme Court chooses to tackle the issue, the proper
scope of a student athlete's free speech rights remains open for debate.
174. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
175. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 600.
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